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Abstract: This paper investigates how monetary shocks are transmitted internationally.  It 
shows that where a national currency is used as an international medium of exchange, the 
international money is non-neutral.  In particular, an increase in the supply of international 
money leads to a transfer of real resources to the international money-issuing country from its 
trading partner.  It also induces an expansion of the non-tradable sector in the international 
money-issuing country, and an expansion the tradable sector in its trading partner.  The real 
impact of a monetary shock is greater under a fixed exchange rate system than under a 
flexible exchange rate system. 
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International Transmission of Monetary Shocks in a Ricardian World 
 
1. Introduction 
What is the mechanism through which monetary policy decisions affect output 
and prices?  This is a perennial question that has generated a large literature 
offering different perspectives.  According to standard textbooks,  monetary 
policy affects short-term interest rates, which in turn affect  investment and 
consumption decisions.   Extending this standard position, the lending view 
observes that given information asymmetry and other frictions in credit markets, 
a monetary policy that raises (lowers) market interest rates tends to raise (lower) 
the external finance premium (which is the difference between the costs of 
external and internal finance), thereby amplifying the impact on borrowing 
(Bernanke & Gertler, 1995).   In contrast, the monetarist’s view contends that a 
monetary impulse, by changing the stock of money, changes the marginal utility 
of money relative to other goods and assets.  To restore equilibrium, money 
holders adjust their spending and asset portfolios.  Therefore, apart from the 
impact on interest rates, monetary shocks can directly influence consumer 
decisions  (Meltzer, 1995).    
 
In an increasingly globalised economy and in light of the recent global financial 
turmoil and subsequent stabilising policies implemented by various 
governments, it is timely to extend the traditional question and ask whether 
monetary policies in  one country can affect output and prices of its trading 
partners and if so, through what mechanism.  There is an extensive empirical 
literature that studies  the  international  monetary  transmission  mechanism  by 
examining movements of financial market prices including the exchange rates 
(Taylor, 1995).  However, to our knowledge, few theoretical studies have 
explicitly modelled the international transmission of monetary policy impulses 
through their impact on international trade.   This is probably due to the fact that 
most trade models deal with “barter” rather than “monetary” transactions.  The 
choice of barter models is reasonable because if one accepts the “separability 
hypothesis” which states that in cases where the marginal rate of substitution 
between goods is independent of the demand for money, the analyses of the 
traditional barter models remain valid for monetary models (Anderson & 
Takayama, 1977; Takayama & Anderson, 1978).  Of those trade models that do 
incorporate money, most adopt the “small country” assumption, and focus on 
how the small country’s policies such as currency devaluation and monetary 
expansion can affect its own welfare (Kemp, 1982; Takayama & Anderson, 
1978).   
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The purpose of this paper is to develop a set of monetary trade models to 
investigate how monetary policy shocks are transmitted internationally.  In 
particular, we ask (1) how a monetary policy change in one country may affect 
itself and its trading partner; and (2) how the transmission mechanisms of 
monetary shocks may differ under different exchange rate regimes.    
 
We conduct our investigation in a simple two-country, three-good Ricardian 
framework and study the international transmission of monetary shocks under 
three different regimes.  We start with  a benchmark model of Regime One 
where two national currencies are used in international trade, but there is no 
demand in one country for holding another country’s currency.  In this 
benchmark model, money is shown to be neutral, which is consistent with the 
findings of the mainstream literature.  
 
In light of the observation that most international trade is mediated by a few 
currencies, of which the US dollar is dominant (Goldberg & Tille, 2008), we 
develop two other models of  Regime Two and Regime Three, where  only 
country 2’s national currency is used in international trade.  A flexible exchange 
rate system operates in Regime Two, and a fixed exchange rate system operates 
in Regime Three. 
 
Suppose international trade is mediated by the national currency of country 2.  
Since country 2’s national currency becomes an international currency, there 
will be a demand for holding it in country 1 as well.  Consequently a change in 
the supply of the international currency will not only affect economic decisions 
in country 2, but also affect those in country 1.  Specifically, an increase in the 
supply of money in country 2 tends to increase the nominal demand for imports 
from country 1, which in turn increases country 1’s nominal income and its 
demand for country 2’s currency.  As this increased demand for country 2’s 
currency can only be satisfied by increased exports to country 2, there must be a 
transfer of real resources from country 1 to country 2.  The increased exports 
also mean that the tradeable sector in country 1 has to expand at the expense of 
the non-tradable sector; correspondingly the tradable sector contracts in country 
2 as some of import needs are financed by the newly created money instead of 
export revenue.  Therefore in contrast to the benchmark model in which money 
is neutral, when a national currency also serves as an international currency, the 
international money is no longer neutral even in the absence of any price 
rigidities.  In particular, an increase in the supply of international money leads 
to a real resource transfer to the international money-issuing country and 
structural changes in both countries.  
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The extent to which an international monetary shock has real effects may be 
affected by exchange rate systems.   Under a flexible exchange rate system, an 
increase in country 2’s money supply tends to lower the exchange rate (defined 
as the price of country 2’s currency in terms of country 1’s currency).  This 
downward pressure on exchange rate is however partly offset by the increased 
demand for country 2’s currency in country 1; hence the exchange rate does not 
fall to the same extent as the increase in the money supply.   Under a fixed 
exchange rate system, an increase in country 2’s money supply puts downward 
pressure on the exchange rate, which compels country 1’s monetary authority to 
intervene by buying country 2’s currency using its own created money.  The 
upshot is that both foreign exchange reserve and money supply in country 1 go 
up.  Since the increase in foreign exchange reserve also has to be backed by an 
increase in exports to country 2, the real transfer to country 2 is larger, and 
consequently a greater structural change needs to take place under  a  fixed 
exchange rate system. 
 
In the following, we develop three simple models which formalise the above 
narrative.  Section 2 presents the  benchmark model in which two freely 
convertible national currencies are used in international trade.  Section 3 adapts 
the benchmark model by assuming that international trade is mediated by one of 
the national currencies.  It investigates the international transmission 
mechanism of monetary shocks under a flexible exchange rate system and a 
fixed exchange rate system, respectively.  The concluding section, section 4, 
discusses some distinctive features of our models and their implications.   
 
2. Regime One: The Benchmark Model  
Consider  a Ricardian world with two countries, country 1 with a population of N1, and 
country 2 with a population of N2.  There are three goods, X, Y and Z.  Country 1 specialises 
in the production of good X, and country 2 in good Y.  Good Z is produced in both countries, 
and is not traded internationally.  Labor is assumed to be immobile between the two countries. 
 
International trade between the two countries is meditated by the currencies of both countries.  
The currencies are freely convertible.  Individual consumers in both countries are assumed to 
derive utility from the consumption of the three goods and from the holding of real balances 
of their own currencies
1.  The decision problem of a representative consumer in country 1 is: 
                                                   
1 If both national currencies are used in international trade, then arguably there should be a demand for holding 
both currencies in both countries.  However, we have chosen the simpler benchmark where there is no separate 5 
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The decision problem for a representative consumer in country 2 is similar:  
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The variables in the above decision problems are defined as follows.   
,, iii xyz  (i=1, 2) are quantities of goods X, Y, and Z consumed by an individual 
in country i;  ij p (i=1, 2; j=x,y,z) is the price of good j  in country i, and is 
























 is the average price in 
country 2; 
i w  (i=1, 2) is the wage rate in country i;  
i m  (i=1, 2) is the initial nominal money balance held by an individual in country 
i;   
/ i ixyz mPis the demand for real balances by an individual in country i; and  
e is the exchange rate (defined as the price of country 2’s currency in terms of 
country 1’s currency). 
 
Solving the decision problems give us the demand functions for goods and real 
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(2.1) 
                                                                                                                                                              
demand in one country for another country’s currency because this seems to be the assumption implicit in much 
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On the production side, we assume that all goods are produced with labor only.  The 
production functions are:  
Country 1:   1 11 xx X aL = ;   1 11 zz Z aL =  
Country 2:   2 22 yy Y aL = ;   2 22 zz Z aL =  
Assuming perfect competition, we obtain the money prices of goods which, in equilibrium, 


































=           (2.3) 
In equilibrium, all markets clear, which means the following conditions are met:  
Labor markets:     11 1 xz LLN +=   ;  22 2 yz LLN +=          (2.4) 
Markets for good Z:     11 1 Nz Z = ;    22 2 Nz Z =             (2.5) 
Market for good X:    11 22 1 Nx Nx X +=             (2.6) 
Market for good Y:     11 22 2 Ny Ny Y +=               (2.7) 
Foreign exchange market:  
1
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Solving equations (2.1)-(2.8), we obtain the equilibrium exchange rate, wages, prices, and 








































































































































































That is, an increase in the supply of country 2’s currency weakens the currency, raises the 
wage rate in country 2 and the prices of goods produced in country 2, but has no impact on 
the wage rate in country 1 or the prices of goods produced in country 1.   
 
Moreover, it is easy to see that the quantities of goods consumed in each country  are 
independent of the money supply of either country ( 12 , mm ), which means money is neutral.   
To summarize, we have 
 Proposition 1. If both national currencies are used in international trade, and if there is no 
demand in one country for holding another country’s currency, then money is neutral.  That 
is, an increase in the supply of one country’s currency leads to a depreciation of that 
currency and raises the nominal wage rate and prices in that country; but has no effects on 
real variables in either country.  
 
3.  International trade mediated by a single national currency 
In the last section, we assume that both currencies are used in international trade, 
and that there is no demand in either country for holding another country’s 
currency.  This is not, in our judgement, a realistic assumption.  As mentioned 
earlier, only a few currencies are routinely used in international trade, of which 
the  US dollar  enjoys  a dominant position.  Consequently in most countries, 
there is a demand for holding these international currencies.  In light of this 
observation, we assume in this section that international trade is mediated by 
one national currency, namely the currency of country 2.   We also assume that 
since country 2’s currency becomes an international currency, there is a demand 
for holding it in country 1 as well as in country 2.   
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3.1. Regime Two: Flexible exchange rates 
First consider the case under a flexible exchange rate system.  Since, by 
assumption, there is a demand in country 1 for holding country 2’s currency, the 
decision problem of the representative consumer in country 1 changes to:   
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is the average price of good X and good Z;  11 / xz mPis 
the demand for real balances in domestic currency;  12 / y FX p is the demand for real balances 
in foreign exchange (i.e., the currency of country 2);  1 m and  1 FX eare initial money holdings 
in domestic and foreign currency, respectively.  
 
The decision problem for individuals in country 2 remains the same as in the benchmark 
model.    Solving the consumer decision problems in both countries, we obtain the demand 
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The production side remains unchanged, so we have the same price-wage relationship as in 
the benchmark model (equations (2.3)).   The market clearing conditions for labor and goods 
also remain unchanged (equations (2.4)-(2.7)).  However due to the demand for holding 
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The left-hand side of equation (3.4) is the quantity of foreign exchange demanded which is 
the sum of the demand for foreign exchange holdings and the foreign exchange demanded to 
finance imports.  The right-hand side is the supply of foreign exchange consisting of foreign 
exchange earnings from exports and initial foreign exchange holdings. 
 
Jointly solving equations (3.1)-(3.4) and (2.3)-(2.7), we obtain the equilibrium values of all 
the endogenous variables, which we discuss below.  
(1) Quantities demanded for foreign exchange holdings and for goods 
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From the above, we can see that the equilibrium quantities of goods are dependent on the 
supply of money in country 2 ( 2 m ), but not by the supply of money in country 1 ( 1 m ).  In 
other words, the money not used in international trade is neutral, but the international money 








































































These suggest that with an increase in supply of money in country 2, there is an increased 
demand in country 1 for holding foreign exchange (country 2’s currency).  Meanwhile, the 
quantities of  all goods consumed in country 2  fall, whereas the quantities of  all goods 
consumed in country 1 increase.  Thus an increase in the supply of money in country 2 leads 
to a transfer of wealth from the country 1 to the country 2 because the newly created money, 
while costs no real resources, commands real purchasing power in the international market.  
The negative impact on country 1 is also apparent from other variables which we turn to next.  
 
(2) Allocation of productive resources  
Since the international monetary shock has a real impact on consumption decisions as shown 
above, it is to be expected that this will have ramifications for production as well.  From our 
model, we can derive relative shares of labor resources devoted to the tradable and non-
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These imply that an increase in the supply of money in country 2 leads to a relative expansion 
of the tradable sector in country 1, and a relative contraction of the tradable sector in country 
2.  The tradable sector in country 1 expands because the increase in demand for good X in 
country 2, and the increased demand in country 1 for holding country 2’s currency which has 
to be met through increased foreign exchange earnings. 
 
(3) Consumer prices, relative wage rate and the terms of trade    
The equilibrium exchange rate, wages and prices are:  
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Not surprisingly, an increase in the supply of money country 2 lowers the exchange rate.  
Moreover, the monetary shock originated in country 2 increases the prices of all goods in 
country 1, or in other words, following the monetary shock  in country 2, inflation is 
“exported” to country 1.   
 
























，if   21 1 3 2 3 ( )( ) αβ α α β β <+ +. 
A sufficient condition for  21 1 3 2 3 ( )( ) αβ α α β β <+ +to hold is that in both countries the 
expenditure share for imports is smaller than the expenditure share for domestically made 
goods (which is the case for most, if not all, countries in the real world).     
Given  21 1 3 2 3 ( )( ) αβ α α β β <+ +, an increase in the supply of money in country 2 results in 
country 1’s wage rate falling relative to that of country 2, and the terms of trade deteriorating 
for country 1 as well.   Intuitively, as money supply in country 2 increases, nominal demand 
in country 2 for all goods increases.  That is, country  2  wants to consume  more  of its 
domestically made goods (leaving less to export) and to import more.  This is made possible 
by  country 1  importing less, exporting more and holding more of  country  2’s  currency.  
Therefore the terms of trade tends to fall for country 1.  The relative wage in country 1 also 
falls due to the linear relationship between prices and the  wage rate in the Ricardian 
framework.  It is theoretically possible (although practically unlikely) that country 1’s terms 
of trade may improve if both countries are heavily reliant on imports (i.e., both  2 α and 1 β are 
very large so that  21 1 3 2 3 ( )( ) αβ α α β β >+ +).  In that case, a large  1 β would translate an 
increase in country 2’s money supply into a large increase in demand for country 1’s export, 
which could push up the terms of trade for country 1.  Since meeting the increased export 
demand requires the contraction of the non-tradable sector in country 1, it is more likely to 
succeed if a large portion country 1’s domestic demand is met by imports (i.e., a large  2 α ).      
3. 2. Regime Three: Fixed exchange rates 
Next consider the case under a fixed exchange rate system.  We assume that country 1’s 
currency is fixed at a certain level to the currency of country 2 and that it is the responsibility 
of country 1’s monetary authority to maintain that fixed rate.  Under the fixed exchange rate 
system, the decision problems for individuals in both countries are the same as those under a 
flexible exchange rate system, except that the exchange rate in the budget constraints is fixed 
at  e .  Correspondingly, the  demand functions for goods, domestic moneys and foreign 
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The price-wage relationship and the market clearing conditions for labor and goods remain 
the same as in the benchmark model (equations (2.3)-(2.7)).   The fixed exchange rate is 
maintained by country 1’s monetary authority through buying or selling country 2’s currency 
in the foreign exchange market.  The authority is assumed to have a initial foreign exchange 
reserve of  1 R .  The clearing condition for the foreign exchange market is: 
1
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On the left-hand side of equation (3.4’) is the demand for foreign exchange consisting of the 
transaction demand for foreign exchange, the private demand for foreign exchange holdings, 
and foreign exchange reserve held by country 1’s monetary authority.  On the right-hand side 
is the supply for foreign exchange consisting of the foreign exchange receipts from trade, 
initial private foreign exchange holdings and initial official foreign exchange reserve. 
The general equilibrium solutions for the model with fixed exchange rates are as follows: 
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From the above, we can derive comparative statics results with respect to similar categories 
of variables as in the case under a flexible exchange rate system:   
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The above results show that  if we are  concerned with consumption, production, prices, 
relative wage, and the terms of trade, the directions of the impact of a monetary shock on 
these variables are the same under both exchange rate systems. The only difference is that 
under a flexible exchange rate, an increase in money supply in country 2 leads to a fall in 
exchange rate, but under a fixed exchange rate, it results in an increase in official foreign 
exchange reserve in country 1 and correspondingly an increase in country 1’s money supply.  
To summarise the results so far in this section, we have 
Proposition 2.  If only one of the national currencies is used in international trade, and if 
there is a demand for holding the international currency in both countries, then the 
international money is  not neutral.  In particular, an increase in the supply of the 
international money induces an expansion of the non-tradable sector in the international 
money-issuing country, and an expansion of the tradable sector in its trading partner.  The 
monetary expansion leads to a transfer of real resources to the international money-issuing 
country from its trading partner.  Meanwhile, inflation is exported to the trading partner, and 
the trading partner is likely to experience a fall in relative wage rate and a deterioration of 
its term of trade.  16 
 
 
3.3. Transmission of monetary shocks: flexible exchange rates vs. fixed exchange rates 
We have shown above that a change in the supply of international money have real effects 
under both a flexible exchange rate system and a fixed exchange rate system.  However, the 
magnitudes and the paths of transmission  differ under different exchange  rate  systems.   
Under a fixed exchange rate system, an increase in the money supply in country 2 puts 
downward pressure on the exchange rate, but since exchange rate is not allowed to adjust, 
country 1’s foreign exchange reserve must increase, so must the money supply in country 1.  
Consequently, the inflationary impact on country 2 is likely to be greater.  In addition, since 
both the private demand for foreign exchange holdings and official foreign exchange reserve 
change in response to the monetary shock, the proportion of the newly created money that is  
held in country 1 would  be greater.  As a result there would be a  larger transfer of real 
resources to country 1, and correspondingly a greater impact on consumption and production 
decisions in both countries.  
We have conducted 4 numerical simulations to compare the relative response to a monetary 
shock under two different exchange rate systems.  All simulations give us the same results.  
We present one simulation in detail below as an illustration.
2    
Consider the flexible exchange rate system first.  Assuming the following parameter values: 
12345 0.2 ααααα = = = = = , 1234 0.25 ββββ = = = = ,  1 10 N = ,  2 1 N = ,  1 1, FX =  
11 1 xz aa = = ,   22 2 yz aa = = ,  










































                                                   
2 Details of other simulation results can be obtained from the corresponding author.  Other simulations have 
different values of preference variables ( i α , i β , i=1, 2, …5) and different values of population size in each 






































































































If  12 10, 30 mm = = the exchange rate is  *6 e = .  Suppose the exchange rate is fixed at  6 e = , 








































































































































Starting from an equilibrium  with  the chosen  parameter values, including that 
12 10, 30 mm = = , we can see how economies respond to an international monetary shock 























where the subscript X denotes flexible exchange rate system, and the subscript F denotes 
fixed exchange rate system. 
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The above inequalities imply that under a flexible exchange rate system, an increase in the 
supply of money in country 2 will have a smaller inflationary impact in country 1, but a 
larger inflationary impact in country 2.   
 








































































These inequalities imply that under a flexible exchange rate system, a smaller amount of the 
newly created international money is held in country 1, and there is correspondingly a smaller 
reduction in consumption in country 1 and a smaller increase in consumption in country 2.  In 
other words, a flexible exchange rate system allows a smaller amount of real resource transfer 
to country 2. 
 



































These suggest that under a flexible exchange rate system, less resource re-allocation takes 
place following a monetary shock.  In other words, the monetary shock has a smaller impact 
on stimulating the tradeable sector in country 1 and the non-tradable sector in country 2. (here 
please check the last sentence because I corrected the sign in the second inequality above) 
Summarising the above analysis, we have:  
Proposition 3.  Compared to the case with a fixed exchange rate system, under a flexible 
exchange rate system, an increase in the supply of international money has a larger 19 
 
inflationary impact on the international money-issuing country, and a smaller impact on its 
trading partner.  Moreover the monetary shock leads to a smaller amount of real resource 
transfer to the international money-issuing country, and has a smaller impact on resource re-
allocation in both the money-issuing country and its trading partner. 
Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that a flexible exchange rate system does not insulate a country 
from international monetary shocks as generally believed even in the absence of any price 
rigidities.  However, from the perspective of the country that uses another country’s currency 
in international trade, a flexible exchange rate system has the advantage of reducing the 
impact of the international monetary shock.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have developed a set of three models to study the mechanism through which 
monetary shocks are transmitted internationally.  Our conclusions are threefold.  First, if there 
is no demand in one country for holding another country’s currency, then money is neutral.   
Secondly, if there is an international currency that is held in  both  countries, then the 
international money is not neutral.  An expansion of  the international money leads to a 
transfer of real resources to the international money-issuing country  and  induces an 
expansion of both the non-tradable sector in the international money-issuing country and the 
tradable sector of its trading partner.  Thirdly, the real impact of an international monetary 
shock is greater under a fixed exchange rate system than under a flexible exchange rate 
system.   
The  paper  has some distinct features.    First,  the paper explicitly models the demand for 
holding international money in a Ricardian setting.   This allows us to highlight  the 
possibility that a foreign monetary shock can affect the domestic economy by changing the 
domestic demand for holding foreign exchange, which correspondingly affects production 
and consumption outcomes.    This transmission mechanism is different from those 
emphasized in the literature.  For example, under a flexible exchange rate regime, incomplete 
exchange rate pass-through is considered to be an important reason why international 
monetary shocks may have real effects (Goldberg & Knetter, 1997).  In our model, a change 
in exchange rate is completely passed through to prices, but there is an incomplete pass-20 
 
through from a change in foreign money supply to exchange rate since the demand for 
holding foreign money changes. 
Second, the model includes both the tradeable sector and non-tradable sector and emphases 
the structure changes in both countries in response to the monetary shock.  This seems to be 
relevant to the debate on the causes and the global ramifications of financial crises.  For 
example, it is possible to infer from our models that a monetary expansion in an international 
money-issuing country (e.g. the US) can lead to an artificial expansion in its non-tradable 
sector, and an artificial expansion in the tradeable sector in its trading partners, such as China.   
To the extent that such artificial expansion is not sustainable in the long term, one might 
expect that the impact of the system breakdown would be more intensely felt by the non-
tradable sector in the international money-issuing country and the tradeable sector in the 
international money-using country.  Of course, to tell a compelling story about the 
international implications of a financial crisis, it would be necessary to explicitly model 
capital and its movements across national borders, which we hope to do in future research.  
Another possible extension to this paper is to introduce a third country and a second 
international  currency to the models.  Such an extension could  be used to study  the 
implications of the rise of a new international currency (e.g., the Euro)  in a US dollar 
dominated world market.  
A weakness of our model is that it has a highly specific structure partly due to the Ricardian 
framework.  This gives rise to the question as to whether the results of our model are robust.  
In our view, while the concrete results in our paper are obtained based on a very specific 
model, the logic of the results seem to hold in more general settings provided that country 1’s 
demand for holding country 2’s money increases when the supply of country 2’s money 
increases.  Since country 2 has to meet the increased demand for country 2’s money by 
exporting more, production structure will need to change to accommodate that and relative 
prices will change correspondingly.  The question is then whether country 1’s demand for 
country 2’s money will in fact increase under more general model specifications.  We believe 
the answer is most likely yes because a higher money supply in country 2 increases its total 
demand including the demand for country 1’s exports.  Consequently, country 1’s nominal 
income tends to increase which in turn increases its demand for country 2’s money.   21 
 
Therefore it is likely that the basic results of our paper would carry over to a more general 
model.   
 
It is of course possible that an increase in money supply in country 2 may lead to a fall 
(instead of a rise) in the demand for holding country 2’s money.  For example, if the increase 
in money supply is so substantial that country 1 loses its confidence in country 2’s money, it 
will reduce its holdings.   But in that case, country 2’s money would be in danger of losing its 
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